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ABSTRACT 
ECONOMICS OF FIXED-DOSE COMBINATION DRUGS APPROVED IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
SEPTEMBER 2015 
JING HAO, M.D. SHANXI MEDICAL UNIVERSITY 
M.S., SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE 
M.P.H., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Rosa Rodriguez-Mongio 
 
Patent is the most important form of intellectual property protection for new drugs. Patent 
extension and market exclusivity currently serve as major regulatory incentives to promote new 
drugs.  Combination drug, or fixed-dose combination (FDC) are formulations that contain two or 
more active ingredients in a single pill. FDCs, especially combinations of singe drugs that are 
already in the market, are common strategy for brand-name drug companies to extent the patent 
and exclusivity life. The substitution of single drug products that soon have generic alternatives 
with newer, brand-name combinations lead to potential increases in pharmaceutical expenditures 
and raises concerns on economic burden. The study found that the effective patent life increased 
overtime during the past three decades; however the effective patent life length was not 
significantly associated with an increase in the number of approved new molecular entities 
(NMEs), which often represent innovative new drugs. Other incentives, besides the patent life, 
need to be considered as effective incentives to stimulate pharmaceutical innovations. The 
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findings support hypothesis that the number of FDC approvals increased overtime from 1980s to 
2012, while the approval number of the NME and new therapeutic Biologics License 
Applications decreased during last decade.  The findings also support hypothesis that the 
pharmaceutical company market FDC drugs shortly before the generic versions of the single 
ingredients enter the market extending the patent and marketing exclusivity life of drugs 
included in the combination. In regard to the economic concern of the FDC, the study found that 
the FDC average wholesale price (AWP) unit price increased significantly over time 1980-2012 
and that pharmaceutical companies set FDC AWP, at the same level of the costliest single active 
ingredient in the combination as pricing strategy to shift demand from single active ingredients 
facing generic competition toward new FDC drugs.  The price difference between FDC and 
single ingredient drugs varied by therapeutic class, the year the FDC entered into the US market 
and the number of single drugs in the combination that have generic drugs at FDC market entry.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Innovative new drugs are important to advance population health care by presenting new 
treatment options for patients. However, the number of innovative new drugs (estimated by 
drugs approved by the FDA as New Molecular Entity, NME) has decreased in the 2000s, 
compare to previous decades
1.  The economics behind the pharmaceutical industry’s new drug 
research and development (R&D) are complex, including considerations of patent life, market 
size, public funding, economics of scale of selected therapeutic classes, prevalence of disease, 
and status of scientific development, and these considerations do not necessarily always address 
the needs of patients
2,3
.  For example, given the growing public health threat of antibiotic 
resistance and calls for innovative new antibiotics, pharmaceutical companies are curtailing their 
R&D on innovative new antibiotics because of economic disincentives, i.e., that the profit return 
is low
4,5
. 
A patent is the most important form of intellectual property protection for new drugs. 
Under a patent, the brand-name drug pharmaceutical company can charge a high drug price and 
earn above-normal profit. When a patent expires, generic drugs normally enter the market and 
bring the medication price down. Earlier studies indicate that patent protection is important for 
                                                 
1 Kaitin KI, DiMasi JA. Pharmaceutical innovation in the 21st century: new drug approvals in the first 
decade, 2000-2009. Clin Pharmacol Ther. 2011;89(2):183-8.  
2
 Boots I, Sukhai RN, Klein RH, Holl RA, Wit JM, Cohen AF, et al. Stimulation programs for pediatric 
drug research--do children really benefit? Eur J Pediatr. 2007;166(8):849-55. 
3 Love J. Pharmaceutical research and development and the patent system. Int J Health Serv. 
2005;35(2):257-63.  
4
 Nelson R. Antibiotic development pipeline runs dry. New drugs to fight resistant organisms are not 
being developed, experts say. Lancet. 2003;362(9397):1726-7.Sonderholm J. Wild-card patent extensions 
as a means to incentivize research and development of antibiotics. J Law Med Ethics. 2009;37(2):240-6. 
5
 Sonderholm J. Wild-card patent extensions as a means to incentivize research and development of 
antibiotics. J Law Med Ethics. 2009;37(2):240-6. 
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advancing pharmaceutical innovations, and the absence of patent protection would affect the 
innovation efforts of pharmaceutical companies
6
.  
Currently, both patent extension and market exclusivity serve as the focus of policy 
proposals and regulatory incentives to promote R&D by pharmaceutical companies
7
. For 
example, the Waxman-Hatch Act (WHA) enacted in 1984 allows sponsors of FDA-approved 
new drug applications (NDA) to recover the time that the FDA spent on the pharmaceutical 
application review and half of the patent time the sponsor dedicated to clinical trials and 
administrative activities required for FDA approval
8
.  
Pharmaceutical companies use a variety of strategies, other than developing innovative 
new drugs, to extend patent and market exclusivity life of their products
9
. A fixed-dose 
combination (FDC) drug, which is the formulation of two or more active ingredients in a single 
tablet, is one example. A drug introduced for the first time in the US market as an FDC may 
contain only NMEs or a mix of NMEs and already-marketed products (i.e., NME & New 
Combination), or only already marketed products (i.e., New Combination). The use of 
combinations of products that are already marketed in the US has been a common strategy for 
brand-name drug companies to extend the patent and exclusivity life of individual drugs, 
                                                 
6
 Cohen W, Nelson RR, Walsh JP. Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and 
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not). National Bureau of Economic Research. 2000. 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf. Accessed March14th 2015. 
7
 Kesselheim AS. Using market-exclusivity incentives to promote pharmaceutical innovation. The New 
England journal of medicine. 2010;363(19):1855-62. 
8
 Grabowski H, Vernon J. Longer patents for increased generic competition in the US. The 
Waxman-Hatch Act after one decade. PharmacoEconomics. 1996;10 Suppl 2:110-23. 
9
 Bhat VN. Patent term extension strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceuticals Policy and 
Law 2005;6:109-22. 
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especially since implementation of the WHA, which lowered the barrier for generic entry
10,11
. 
Importantly, over the last decade, prescribing patterns led to an increased utilization of FDC 
drugs, which has raised concerns about their economic burden
12
. 
Existing literature examines the association of a specific regulatory change with effective 
patent life and/or drug innovation. However, to the authors’ knowledge, there is no evidence on 
whether an increase in effective patent life protection is effective in bringing more innovative 
new drugs to the market. Further, no empirical analysis has been conducted to assess the 
approval and extension of patent and exclusivity life of FDCs. Existing studies assessing price 
differences of FDCs and single ingredient drugs included in the combination focus on specific 
FDCs of a few therapeutic classes, such as antihypertensive and respiratory medications
13,14
. 
However, no published study has assessed the pricing structure of all FDA-approved FDC drugs 
at the time of their first launch into the US market compared to all single ingredient drugs 
included in the combination, to estimate overall price differences between FDCs and single 
ingredient drugs, and by therapeutic class. A full literature review is presented within each 
chapter.  
                                                 
10
 Bhat VN. Patent term extension strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceuticals Policy and 
Law 2005;6:109-22. 
11
 Hong SH, Shepherd MD, Scoones D, Wan TT. Product-line extensions and pricing strategies 
of brand-name drugs facing patent expiration. Journal of managed care pharmacy. JMCP. 
2005;11(9):746-54. 
12
 Hong SH, Wang J, Tang J. Dynamic view on affordability of fixed-dose combination antihypertensive 
drug therapy. Am J Hypertens. 2013;26(7):879-87.  
13
 Friedman HS, Eid NS, Crespi S, Wilcox TK, Reardon G. Retrospective claims study of fluticasone 
propionate/salmeterol fixed-dose combination use as initial asthma controller therapy in children despite 
guideline recommendations. Clin Ther. 2009;31(5):1056-63. 
14
 Brixner DI, Lenhart G, Young DC, Samuelson WM. The effect of fixed combination of fluticasone and 
salmeterol on asthma drug utilization, asthma drug cost, and episodes of asthma exacerbations. Curr Med 
Res Opin. 2007;23(11):2887-95. 
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Thus, the goal of this dissertation, containing three manuscripts/chapters, is to investigate 
the economics of FDC drugs. Specifically, in chapter I, we explore whether a longer effective 
patent life is associated with more NME approvals and whether current regulatory changes are 
associated with an increase in NME approvals. Chapter II aims to provide empirical evidence on 
the approval trend of FDC drugs from 1980 to 2012, to assess the market-entry timing of the 
FDCs, and to evaluate whether FDCs represent an effective patent life extension, compared to 
the single active ingredients included in the combination. In chapter III, we compare the Average 
Wholesale Price (AWP, i.e., listed drug price for pharmaceutical products sold by wholesalers to 
retail pharmacies and nonretail providers and commonly used as a drug price benchmark) 
difference between all FDCs of new drugs approved by the FDA in the period 1980-2012 and 
single active ingredients included in the combination, and investigate the factors that are 
associated with the price difference of FDC drugs and single active ingredients included in the 
combination.   
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CHAPTER 1 
ARE PATENTS AND MARKET EXCLUSIVITIES AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY TO 
STRENGTHEN PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION? 
 
Abstract  
Patents and market exclusivities serve as regulatory incentives to promote pharmaceutical 
innovation. This study assessed associations between major US regulatory changes enacted in 
the last three decades, and the effective patent life and FDA approved New Molecular Entities 
(NMEs) from 1980-2009. The Waxman Hatch Act (WHA) was associated with a 3.64 years 
increase in the maximum effective patent life (p=0.01). The Prescription Drug User Fee Act 
(PDUFA) was associated with a 1.1 year increase in the minimum effective patent life (p=0.03). 
The number of approved NMEs increased 45.7% (p=0.02) and 37.1% (p=0.04) 6 and 7 years, 
respectively, after the WHA enactment. Likewise, the number of approved NMEs increased 
42.4% (p=0.007), 65.8% (p<0.0001) and 51.3% (p=0.0008) 2, 3 and 4 years, respectively after 
PDUFA enactment, and 76.1% (p=0.0006) after the enactment of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act. Conversely, the number of FDA approved NMEs decreased 43.5% (p<0.0001), 
30.0% (p=0.01) and 30.4% (p =0.02) 1, 2 and 4 years, respectively after the enactment of the 
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act. The effective patent life length was not 
associated with an increase in the number of approved NMEs. Other incentives, besides the 
patent life, need to be considered to stimulate pharmaceutical innovation.  
 
Keywords: Effective Patent Life, New Molecular Entities, Drug Regulation, Drug Approvals, 
Food and Drug Administration, Patents, Exclusivities  
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Introduction 
Intellectual property (IP) law promotes scientific progress and facilitates the transfer of 
technology by requiring public disclosure of inventions [1]. However, intellectual property 
regulation also limits competition and increases the cost of patented products[1]. A patent, 
granted by the United States (US) Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), is “a right for a 
limited period of time to exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention” [2]. A 
patent is the most important form of intellectual property regulation for new pharmaceuticals [3, 
4].  
In the U.S., the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), enacted on June 8, 1995, 
established a 20-year patent term (i.e., patent statutory term) from the filing date of a patent 
application before the USPTO. Before this enactment, patentees received 17 years of patent life 
from the date of patent issued by the USPTO. The FDA approval review process requires 
extensive preclinical and clinical studies. Thus, the effective patent term (i.e., effective patent 
life) left after the FDA approval is shorter than the regulatory patent term [4]. The USPTO grants 
pharmaceutical patent extensions [5, 6] which partially restore the patent time spent in clinical 
trials and patent application review time [7, 8]. The FDA grants market exclusivity rights to 
sponsor companies upon approval of certain drug applications [9]. The FDA cannot approve a 
generic application for a drug until the exclusivity expires. 
Major regulatory changes occurred during the last 30 years in the US patent and drug 
regulatory systems which include: the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act 
(Waxman-Hatch Act -WHA) in 1984, the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) in 1992, and 
the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) in 1997. The WHA allows 
sponsors of FDA-approved new drug applications (NDA) to recover, with certain limits, the time 
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spent by the FDA on a pharmaceutical application review and half of the patent time the sponsor 
dedicated to clinical trials and administrative activities required for FDA approval [10]. PDUFA 
authorizes the FDA to collect fees from companies that produce certain human drug and 
biological products [11, 12]. FDAMA provides an additional 6 months of market exclusivity 
attached to any existing exclusivity or patent protection on a drug addressing pediatric studies [6, 
7].  
Both patent extensions and market exclusivity periods serve as regulatory incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to conduct research and development (R&D) [12-18]. Patent 
extensions and market exclusivities are currently the focus of policy proposals to promote 
innovation [6]. Therefore, it is important to examine the effectiveness of these regulations on 
enhancing patent life and promoting approvals of new molecular entities (NMEs).  
Prior research has examined the association between specific regulatory changes, drug 
approvals and the effective patent life of pharmaceuticals [4, 8, 10, 12, 18]. The increase in the 
average effective patent life resulting from the WHA extension was estimated around 2 years 
[10]. In addition, although PDUFA reduced the FDA review time by more than 1 year [12], the 
impact on increasing pharmaceutical spending on R&D remains unknown [6]. Almost half of all 
patents filled before the USPTO by US applicants after URAA enhancement through 2007 
benefited from the use of the 20-year patent statutory term [4]. FDAMA enactment resulted in an 
increase in the drug studies conducted in the pediatric population; nevertheless, FDAMA did not 
lead to an increase in the approval of pharmaceuticals indicated for children [19].  
No study has examined the association between the length of the effective patent life and 
the number of NMEs approved by the FDA. Thus, there is need to empirically assess the 
effectiveness of the changes in regulation affecting drug patents and exclusivities of FDA 
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approved NMEs. The specific aims of this study are 1) to assess the association between main 
pharmaceutical regulatory changes enacted in the US in the last three decades and the effective 
patent life of NMEs approved by the FDA, 2) to determine if the length of the effective patent 
life is associated with the number of FDA approvals of NMEs, and 3) to evaluate whether patent 
and drug regulatory changes are associated with changes in the number of approvals of NMEs.  
Data and Methods  
Data were collected from electronic versions of the FDA’s “Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations’’ (Orange Book, OB) from 1980 to 2009 and from the 
FDA's website. Patent information was abstracted from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) website. Data were updated through December 31, 2009. This study included all 
NMEs approved in the U.S. between 1980 and 2009. The following information was extracted: 
drug name, Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ACT) code, therapeutic class, NDA approval 
date, patent expiration date, market exclusivity and generic competition data, and product 
marketing status. 
 This study followed the conceptual model used in prior research to calculate the effective 
patent life (i.e., time period from NME NDA approval to market exclusivity and patent 
expiration) [20]. The study included FDA designated NMEs that were listed as the first NDA 
approved by the FDA for the NME. NMEs were excluded from the analysis if they were never 
marketed after FDA approval, discontinued or withdrawn from the market, or found not to have 
at least one patent listed in the OB at some point during the period of analysis. NMEs were 
categorized into an anatomical main group following the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical 
(ATC) classification system maintained by the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre 
for Drug Statistics Methodology.                           
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The unit of analysis was the first NDA and the first NDA Product Number for each NME 
approved by the FDA during the study period. The FDA review time was estimated as the 
difference between the NDA approval date and the NDA received day. The effective patent and 
market exclusivity life includes the period from the NDA approval to market exclusivity and 
patent expiration. Patents with the minimum and the maximum effective patent life were used to 
estimate the minimum (first patent) and maximum (last patent) effective patent and market 
exclusivity life when several patents were listed in the OB for a NME.  
Summary descriptive statistics were computed for variables included in the analysis. 
Wilcoxon-Sum Rank tests were computed to assess associations between the 
minimum/maximum effective patent life and regulatory changes enacted during the study period. 
The study period was divided into five regulatory periods (1) 1980- WHA(1984); (2) 
WHA(1984) -PDUFA(1992); (3) PDUFA(1992) – URAA(1995); (4) URAA(1995)–
FDAMA(1997); (5) FDAMA(1997) - 2009 to assess the association between the patent and 
exclusivity life and each regulatory measure  compared to previous regulatory policy measure.   
Poisson regression models were performed to assess the association between the number of 
FDA approved NMEs and the minimum/maximum effective patent life controlling for drug 
therapeutic class and the five regulatory changes included in the analysis. Poisson regression 
models also controlled for a 1-10 year time delay in the effect of regulatory changes and 
effective patent life length changes on the pharmaceutical company R&D stage to the USPTO 
filing and FDA approval. All analyses were performed using SAS 9.4 statistical software for 
Windows (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC, USA). Statistical significance was set at 0.05. 
Poisson Regression Models:  
                                                         
10 
 
                       
                                   
Where  = Total number of NME NDA approvals for each therapeutic category by year 
   = Minimum effective patent life for each therapeutic category by year  
  
 = Maximum effective patent life for each therapeutic category by year 
   = Therapeutic class    
  = WHA 
  = PDUFA 
  = URAA 
  = FDAMA 
  denotes a time delay factor, j=1, 2, 3,…..10 (years) and 
β3=0 if    <1984, β3=1 if    >=1984 
β4=0 if    <1992, β4=1 if    >=1992 
β5=0 if    <1995, β5=1 if    >=1995 
β6=0 if    <1997, β6=1 if    >=1997 
 
Results 
In the study period, the FDA approved 739 NMEs; the number of NMEs approved 
increased from the 1980s (n=217) to the 1990s (n=311) and decreased in the period 2000-2009 
(n=211). The patent life analysis included 581 NDA NMEs; and excluded 158 NDA NMEs that 
did not have patent life information listed in the OB. In the study period, the average minimum 
effective patent life was 10.25±3.94 years (median=10.27 years; IQR 6.97) and the average 
maximum effective patent life was 13.56±5.72 years (median=14.00 years; IQR 7.62).  
The WHA was significantly associated with a 3.64 years increase in the maximum effective 
patent life. The median of the maximum effective patent life increased from 9.00 years (IQR 
9.00) before the enactment of the WHA to 12.64 years (IQR 7.50) after the enactment of WHA 
and before PDUFA (p=0.011) (Table 1). PDUFA was significantly associated with an increase in 
the minimum effective patent life. The median of the minimum effective patent life was 9.63 
11 
 
(IQR 7.59) years after the enactment of the WHA and before the enactment of PDUFA; the 
median of the minimum effective patent life increased to 10.73 (IQR 7.36) years after PDUFA 
implementation and before the enactment of URAA (p=0.0283). However, the minimum 
effective patent life decreased significantly after enactment of  FDAMA, compared to the period 
prior to  FDAMA and after the enactment of URAA (median 10.44 years (IQR6.37) and 12.36 
years (IQR 6.54), respectively (p=0.014)(Table 1, Figure1).  
The association between the FDA approved NMEs and the minimum and maximum 
effective patent life controlling for the therapeutic class and regulatory measure was not 
statistically significant with the exception of a 2.5% decrease in number of approvals when 
modeling a one year time delay in the effect of changes in the maximum patent life length 
(p=0.0087) (Table 2, Table 3).  
There is a statistically significant association between the approvals of NMEs by the FDA 
and the specific regulatory measures enacted during the study period. Parameter estimates 
revealed that the WHA was significantly associated with an increase in the FDA approved NMEs 
6-7 years after its enactment. The number of FDA approved NMEs 6 years after the enactment of 
WHA increased 46.09% (p=0.0154) and 45.71% (p=0.0183) in models controlling for the 
minimum and maximum effective patent life, respectively and the therapeutic class.  Likewise, 
the number of FDA approved NMEs 7 years after the implementation of the WHA increased 
38.32% (p=0.0305) and 37.07% (p=0.0391) for the minimum and maximum effective patent life, 
respectively(Table 2, Table 3). 
PDUFA was significantly associated with an increase in the FDA approved NMEs 
immediately following its enactment. The number of FDA approved NMEs 2 years after the 
enactment of PDUFA increased 41.31% (p=0.0089) and 42.43% (p=0.0070) for the minimum 
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and maximum effective patent life, respectively. The number of FDA approved NMEs peaked 3 
years after the implementation of the PDUFA increasing 64.70% (p<0.0001) and 65.81% 
(p<.0001) for the minimum and maximum effective patent life, respectively. The number of 
FDA-approved NMEs 4 years after the implementation of the PDUFA increased 49.32% 
(p=0.0014) and 51.32% (p=0.0008) for the minimum and maximum effective patent life, 
respectively. In addition, PDUFA was associated with a significant decrease in the approvals of 
NMEs 8 to 10 years after its enhancement; FDA-approved NMEs decreased 32.82% (p=0.0102) 
and 30.69% (p=0.0169) for the minimum and maximum effective patent life, respectively 10 
years after its enactment (Table 2, Table 3).  
Likewise, URAA was significantly associated with an increase in the FDA approved NMEs. 
One year after the implementation of URAA, the approvals of NMEs went up 72.24% (p=0.001) 
and 76.10% (p=0.0006) for the minimum and maximum effective patent life, respectively. 
Conversely, FDAMA was significantly associated with a decrease in the FDA approved NMEs. 
One year after the enactment of FDAMA, the approval of NMEs was 44.12% (p<0.0001) and 
43.47% (p<0.0001) lower for the minimum and maximum effective patent life, respectively than 
the prior year (Table 2, Table 3).  
Discussion 
Major regulatory changes in the U.S. patent system and drug regulatory system occurred in 
the past three decades. One of the purposes of the patent system is to stimulate research and 
development in the US. This study assessed to which extent regulatory changes implemented in 
the US in the last 30 years are associated with changes in the number of FDA approved NMEs 
and the effective patent life of pharmaceuticals.  
13 
 
Study results corroborate prior research regarding secular trends in the FDA approval of 
NMEs [21, 22].  Study findings reveal that there is a statistically significant positive association 
between the WHA and PDUFA enactment and the length of the effective patent life. These 
findings are consistent with prior research [4, 8, 10, 12, 18]. 
The assumption that stronger patent protection will stimulate innovation is contentious [5].  
This study evidences that the association between the length of the effective patent life and the 
approvals of NMEs is not statistically significant. Thus, other factors such as market size, public 
funding and status of scientific development may explain the number of FDA approved NMEs 
[23-26].  
Study findings also evidence a statistically significant increase in the number of FDA 
approved NMEs six to seven years after the enhancement of the WHA. The WHA substantially 
increased the patent and exclusivity protection periods and it was enacted with the specific goal 
of balancing the need for innovation and access to generic drugs.  
This study revealed a statistically significant increase in the number of FDA approved 
NMEs two to four years after the enhancement of PDUFA. PDUFA allowed the FDA to collect 
fees from companies that sponsor new drug applications for certain human drug and biological 
products, using those fees to hire more drug reviewers and shorten the time for pharmaceuticals 
to reach the market [12]. The number of full-time equivalent FDA staff devoted to the drug 
application review process nearly doubled from 1,277 in 1992 to 2,503 in 2004 [27]. Before the 
enactment of PDUFA, the average FDA drug application review time in the period 1990-1992 
was 31.0 months; after PDUFA 1993-1996 the FDA review time decreased to 14.5 months[12] 
in spite of the backlog of NDAs awaiting FDA review in 1992 [28]. Thus, the association 
between the enactment of PDUFA and the increase in the approvals of NMEs may be 
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confounded by the fact that PDUFA created an incentive for the FDA to approve more 
pharmaceuticals in exchange for resources from the pharmaceutical companies. 
In addition, while URAA contain general incentives to promote research and development, 
the observed increase in the approvals of NMEs one year after the enactment of URAA in 1995 
may reflect a PDUFA spillover effect. The positive association between PDUFA enactment and 
the FDA approved NMEs does not remain in the mid- or long-term.  
There was a declining pace in the pharmaceutical innovation in the 2000s [29, 30]. Study 
findings confirm the decrease in the number of NMEs approved after the enactment of FDAMA 
and through the 2000s compared to the number of approvals in the 80s and 90s. In fact, in the 
2000s, new indications, new formulations, and new combinations of previously marketed 
products accounted for a large proportion (48.8% in 2006 alone) of the approvals[31]. This 
decreased in the number of NMEs approved by the FDA support our findings that significantly 
fewer NME approvals were observed eight to ten years after enactment of the PDUFA or one, 
two and four years after the implementation of FDAMA.  
In summary, study findings evidence that the extension of patents and market exclusivities 
alone does not effectively translate into pharmaceutical innovation. Thus, further researcher is 
needed to discern other factors behind the research and development of new drugs.  
Limitations  
Study findings must be considered with a few caveats in mind. This study focuses on the 
patent and market exclusivity life of the first NDA of the NME. The study included first and last 
patent listed in the OB and excluded other patents listed in the OB and patents not listed. The 
average time for pharmaceutical preclinical development is estimated  around 5 years and the 
median time for clinical trial and regulatory review periods are estimated at 5.1 and 1.2 years, 
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respectively (Hondeghem et al. 2007; Keyhani et al. 2006).    While the regression models 
estimate the effects of a regulatory change holding the impacts of other regulatory changes 
constant, overlapping policy and regulatory effects may still exists.  
Conclusion 
PDUFA was associated with a statistically significant increase in the minimum effective 
patent life; and the WHA was associated with a statistically significant increase in the maximum 
effective patent life. In addition, the WHA, PDUFA and URAA were associated with a 
statistically significant increase in the NMEs approved by the FDA. The effective patent life 
length was not associated with a statistically significant increase in the number of approved 
NMEs. Research is needed to further elucidate effective regulatory and policy measures to 
incentivize pharmaceutical innovation.   
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Figure 1. Regulatory Changes and Effective Patent Life of FDA approved NMEs, 1980-
2009 
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Table 1. Effective Patent Life of FDA Approved NMEs by Regulatory Period  
Regulatory Measure 
Patent and Pediatric Exclusivity Life in 
Years Minimum Effective Patent Life 
Patent and Pediatric Exclusivity Life in 
Years Maximum Effective Patent Life 
  Mean(Std) Median (IQR) Mean(Std) Median (IQR) 
1. 1980-WHA(1984) 9.14 (4.68) 7.21 (6.82) 10.59 (6.09) 9.00 (9.00) 
2. WHA(1984) – 
PDUFA(1992) 
9.80 (3.95) 9.63 (7.59) 12.73 (6.56) 12.64 (7.50)ƚ 
3. PDUFA(1992) – 
URAA(1995) 
10.75 (4.15) 10.73 (7.36)* 13.48 (6.27) 14.00 (9.69) 
4. URAA(1995) – 
FDAMA(1997) 
11.45 (4.21) 12.36 (6.54) 14.69 (5.38) 14.04 (6.92) 
5. FDAMA(1997)-
2009 
10.28 (3.59) 10.44 (6.37)ϝ 14.26(4.81) 14.06 (5.36) 
FDAMA(1997)- 2004 10.63 (3.65) 11.16 (6.86) 14.69 (5.10) 15.06 (6.25) 
2005-2009 9.45 (3.32) 9.09 (4.95) 13.20 (3.83) 13.61 (3.92) 
1980-2009 10.25(3.94) 10.27(6.97) 13.56(5.72) 14.00 (7.62) 
Note: *denotes statistically significant difference between the minimum effective patent life of policy periods 2. 
WHA(1984) – PDUFA(1992) and 3. PDUFA(1992)-URAA(1995) (p-value 0.0283). 
ϝ denotes statistically significant difference between the minimum effective patent life of policy periods 4. 
URAA(1995) – FDAMA(1997) and 5. FDAMA(1997)-2009 (p-value 0.014).  
Ƚdenotes statistically significant difference between the maximum effective patent life of policy periods 1. 1980-
WHA(1984) and 2. WHA(1984) – PDUFA(1992) (p-value 0.011).  
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Table 2. FDA approved NMEs and Minimum Effective Patent Life, Regulatory Measure 
Years after Enactment Estimate IRR 95% CI 
Lower Bound-Upper Bound 
p-value 
Minimum Effective patent life  
1 -0.0143 0.9858 (-0.0425, 0.0140) 0.3227 
2 0.0077 1.0077 (-0.0215, 0.0369) 0.6048 
3 0.0008 1.0008 (-0.0289, 0.0305) 0.9588 
4 0.0106 1.0107 (-0.0195,  0.0407) 0.4894 
5 0.0079 1.0080 (-0.0227, 0.0385) 0.6109 
6 0.0295 1.0300 (-0.0024, 0.0615) 0.0703 
7 0.0015 1.0015 (-0.0306, 0.0336) 0.9262 
8 0.0020 1.0020 (-0.0322, 0.0361) 0.9105 
9 0.0097 1.0098 (-0.0244, 0.0439) 0.5761 
10 0.0239 1.0242 (-0.0112, 0.0591) 0.1816 
WHA (1984) 
1 -0.0176 0.9826 (-0.3334, 0.2982) 0.9131 
2 -0.1066 0.8989 (-0.4002, 0.1869) 0.4765 
3 -0.0546 0.9468 (-0.3572, 0.2479) 0.7234 
4 -0.0083 0.9918 (-0.2927, 0.2762) 0.9546 
5 0.2116 1.2356 (-0.0832, 0.5063) 0.1596 
6 0.3790 1.4609* (0.0725, 0.6856) 0.0154 
7 0.3244 1.3832* (0.0304,  0.6183) 0.0305 
8 0.1780 1.1948 (-0.1063, 0.4622) 0.2197 
9 0.1410 1.1514 (-0.1367, 0.4187) 0.3197 
10 0.2284 1.2566 (-0.0588, 0.5157) 0.1191 
PDUFA (1992) 
1 0.0446 1.0456 (-0.2444, 0.3336) 0.7622 
2 0.3458 1.4131** (0.0868, 0.6047) 0.0089 
3 0.4990 1.6470**** (0.2539, 0.7440) <.0001 
4 0.4009 1.4932** (0.1554, 0.6465) 0.0014 
5 0.1173 1.1245 (-0.1373, 0.3720) 0.3665 
6 -0.1255 0.8821 (-0.3924, 0.1414) 0.3567 
7 -0.1370 0.8720 (-0.4141, 0.1401) 0.3326 
8 -0.4543 0.6349** (-0.7687, -0.1399) 0.0046 
9 -0.4433 0.6419** (-0.7452, -0.1414) 0.0040 
10 -0.3980 0.6717* (-0.7018, -0.0941) 0.0102 
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Table 2.  (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *p<0.05, **P<0.01, ***p<0.001, ****p<0.0001; IRR=incident rate ratio.  
 
 
  
Years after Enactment Estimate IRR 95% CI  
Lower bound – Upper Bound 
P Value 
URAA (1995) 
1 0.5437 1.7224** (0.2197, 0.8678) 0.0010 
2 -0.0344 0.9662 (-0.3568, 0.2879) 0.8342 
3 -0.2913 0.7473 (-0.6109, 0.0283) 0.0741 
4 -0.2382 0.7880 (-0.5636, 0.0872) 0.1514 
5 -0.2864 0.7510 (-0.6525, 0.0798) 0.1253 
6 -0.3795 0.6842 (-0.7821, 0.0230) 0.0646 
7 -0.3661 0.6935 (-0.7825, 0.0503) 0.0849 
8 0.1121 1.1187 (-0.3037, 0.5280) 0.5972 
9 0.0679 1.0703 (-0.3480, 0.4839) 0.7489 
10 -0.0402 0.9606 (-0.4767, 0.3962) 0.8567 
FDAMA (1997) 
1 -0.5820 0.5588**** (-0.8351, -0.3289) <.0001 
2 -0.3531 0.7025* (-0.6376, -0.0687) 0.0150 
3 -0.2642 0.7678 (-0.5632, 0.0347) 0.0832 
4 -0.3526 0.7029* (-0.6614, -0.0438) 0.0252 
5 -0.1009 0.9041 (-0.4449, 0.2432) 0.5655 
6 0.1136 1.1203 (-0.2630, 0.4901) 0.5545 
7 0.1755 1.1919 (-0.2145, 0.5656) 0.3778 
8 -0.0922 0.9119 (-0.4671, 0.2827) 0.6298 
9 -0.0368 0.9639 (-0.4336, 0.3600) 0.8558 
10 -0.0068 0.9932 (-0.4454, 0.4317) 0.9756 
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Table 3. FDA approved NMEs and Maximum Effective Patent Life and Regulatory Measure 
Years after Enactment Estimate IRR 95% CI 
Lower Bound-Upper Bound 
p-value 
Maximum Effective patent life 
1 -0.0253 0.9750** (-0.0442, -0.0064) 0.0087 
2 -0.0096 0.9904 (-0.0284, 0.0092) 0.3150 
3 -0.0113 0.9888 (-0.0306, 0.0080) 0.2523 
4 0.0040 1.0041 (-0.0144, 0.0225) 0.6674 
5 -0.0065 0.9935 (-0.0252, 0.0122) 0.4961 
6 0.0064 1.0065 (-0.0122, 0.0251) 0.4977 
7 0.0031 1.0031 (-0.0156, 0.0217) 0.7479 
8 0.0024 1.0024 (-0.0169, 0.0216) 0.8079 
9 0.0012 1.0012 (-0.0177, 0.0202) 0.8986 
10 0.0081 1.0081 (-0.0116, 0.0277) 0.4197 
WHA (1984) 
1 0.0408 1.0416 (-0.2780, 0.3596) 0.8020 
2 -0.0689 0.9334 (-0.3676, 0.2297) 0.6510 
3 -0.0281 0.9723 (-0.3337, 0.2775) 0.8569 
4 -0.0144 0.9858 (-0.3039, 0.2752) 0.9226 
5 0.2372 1.2677 (-0.0632, 0.5377) 0.1218 
6 0.3765 1.4571* (0.0636, 0.6893) 0.0183 
7 0.3153 1.3707* (0.0158, 0.6149) 0.0391 
8 0.1715 1.1871 (-0.1186, 0.4617) 0.2466 
9 0.1421 1.1527 (-0.1423, 0.4265) 0.3275 
10 0.2149 1.2398 (-0.0788, 0.5086) 0.1515 
PDUFA (1992) 
1 0.0321 1.0327 (-0.2552, 0.3194) 0.8265 
2 0.3536 1.4243** (0.0966, 0.6107) 0.0070 
3 0.5056 1.6581**** (0.2630, 0.7483) <.0001 
4 0.4142 1.5132*** (0.1716, 0.6568) 0.0008 
5 0.1280 1.1365 (-0.1239, 0.3798) 0.3193 
6 -0.0894 0.9145 (-0.3535, 0.1747) 0.5070 
7 -0.1351 0.8737 (-0.4074, 0.1373) 0.3311 
8 -0.4511 0.6370** (-0.7633, -0.1389) 0.0046 
9 -0.4310 0.6499** (-0.7297, -0.1323) 0.0047 
10 -0.3666 0.6931* (-0.6673, -0.0659) 0.0169 
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Table 3. (Continued) 
Year after Enactment Estimate IRR 95% CI  
Lower Bound – Upper Bound 
P Value 
URAA (1995) 
1 0.5659 1.7610*** (0.2412, 0.8905) 0.0006 
2 -0.0193 0.9808 (-0.3423, 0.3036) 0.9065 
3 -0.2761 0.7587 (-0.5962, 0.0439) 0.0908 
4 -0.2370 0.7890 (-0.5626, 0.0887) 0.1539 
5 -0.2738 0.7605 (-0.6405, 0.0930) 0.1435 
6 -0.3704 0.6904 (-0.7732, 0.0324) 0.0715 
7 -0.3687 0.6916 (-0.7854, 0.0480) 0.0829 
8 0.1093 1.1155 (-0.3071, 0.5258) 0.6069 
9 0.0753 1.0783 (-0.3400, 0.4906) 0.7222 
10 -0.0312 0.9693 (-0.4676, 0.4053) 0.8887 
FDAMA (1997) 
1 -0.5705 0.5653**** (-0.8223, -0.3186) <.0001 
2 -0.3550 0.7012* (-0.6390, -0.0710) 0.0143 
3 -0.2637 0.7682 (-0.561, 0.0336) 0.0821 
4 -0.3630 0.6956* (-0.6708, -0.0553) 0.0208 
5 -0.1058 0.8997 (-0.4493, 0.2378) 0.5463 
6 0.0971 1.1020 (-0.2795, 0.4737) 0.6132 
7 0.1715 1.1871 (-0.2189, 0.5619) 0.3891 
8 -0.0938 0.9105 (-0.4682, 0.2806) 0.6234 
9 -0.0442 0.9568 (-0.4403, 0.3520) 0.8271 
10 -0.0098 0.9902 (-0.4482, 0.4285) 0.9649 
 Note: *p<0.05, **P<0.01, ***p<0.001, ****p<0.0001; IRR=incident rate ratio.  
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CHAPTER 2   
FIXED-DOSE COMBINATION DRUG APPROVALS, PATENTS AND 
EXCLUSIVITIES COMPARED TO SINGLE ACTIVE INGREDIENT 
PHARMACEUTICAL 
 
Abstract  
Background Fixed-dose combinations (FDC) contain two or more active ingredients. The 
effective patent life of FDC compared to single active ingredient has not been assessed.  
Objectives Trends in FDA approved FDC in the period 1980-2012 and time lag between 
approval of FDC and single active ingredients in the combination were assessed, and the 
effective patent life of FDC was compared with their single active ingredients.  
Methods New molecular entities (NMEs), new therapeutic biologics license applications (BLAs) 
and FDC data were collected from the FDA Orange Book and Drugs@FDA. Analysis included 
FDC containing one or more NMEs or BLAs at first FDA approval (NMEs-FDC) and only 
already marketed drugs (Non-NMEs-FDC). Descriptive, Kruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum analyses were performed.  
Results During the study period, the FDA approved 28 NMEs-FDC (3.5% of NMEs) and 117 
non-NMEs-FDC. FDC approvals increased from 12 in the 1980s to 59 in the 2000s. Non-NMEs-
FDC entered the market at a median of 5.43 years (interquartile range 8.57) after first FDA 
approval of single active ingredients in the combination. The Non-NMEs-FDC entered the 
market at a median of 2.33 years (9.94) before single active ingredient generics approval. Non-
NME-FDC added a median of 9.70 (13.49) years to the patent and exclusivity life of the single 
active ingredients in the combination. 
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Conclusion FDC approvals significantly increased over the last twenty years. Pharmaceutical 
companies market FDC drugs shortly before the generic versions of the single ingredients enter 
the market extending the patent and marketing exclusivity life of drugs included in the 
combination. 
Key words: Fixed-dose combination drugs, drug approvals, patent and exclusivity life, FDA 
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Introduction 
Patents are the most important form of intellectual property protection for new drugs [1-
5]. In the US, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), enacted in June 8, 1995, established 
a 20-year patent term (i.e. patent statutory term) from the filling date of a patent application 
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Before URAA, patentees had 
17 years of patent life upon the date when the patent was issued by the USPTO. Patent 
extensions are granted by the USPTO to partly restore the time spent on clinical trials and FDA 
review and market exclusivity are granted by the FDA upon approval of certain drug applications 
[6-8]. Pharmaceutical products do not face generic competition during the effective patent life 
period thus, pharmaceutical companies set up prices of new drugs to maximize profits [5,9]. 
Once the patents and exclusivities expire, generic drugs may enter the market driving down 
pharmaceutical prices.  
Fixed-dose combination drugs (FDCs) are formulations that contain two or more active 
ingredients in a single dosage [10]. According to the FDA, “two or more drugs may be combined 
in a single dose when each component makes a contribution to the claimed effects, and the 
dosage of each component (i.e., amount, frequency, and duration) is such that the combination is 
safe and effective for a significant patient population requiring such concurrent therapy” [11].  
A new molecular entity (NME) and a new biologic license application (BLA) are drugs 
containing active substances that have never before been approved for marketing in the US. 
Some new drugs are first introduced as a FDC in the US market (i.e. NME-FDC).  A NME-FDC 
may contain only NMEs or a mix of NMEs and other already marketed drugs. A Non-NME-FDC 
is a new combination that contains only already marketed drugs (Figure 2). The development and 
marketing of FDCs have been a strategy for brand-name drug companies to extend the drug 
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patent and exclusivity life of pharmaceuticals in the US, particularly after the enactment of the 
Waxman-Hatch Act (WHA) in 1984 [12, 13].    
If a FDC is novel, non-obvious, and useful, it can be patented and the exclusion of 
competitors from the market can be enforced (Figure 3). In this case, the sponsor company is 
able to add patent and exclusivity time to the combination of individual products included in the 
FDC, for which patents and exclusivities may be expired or close to expire. The FDA provides 
three years of market exclusivity to new NME-FDC when the application contains new clinical 
investigations. If the new FDC is not patentable, the patent and exclusivity life of the FDC will 
typically be equal to the three year market exclusivity or the longest patent and exclusivity life of 
its individual components. FDC drugs allow patent holders to maintain the market share for 
products included in the combination, to expand their patent and exclusivity protection, and to 
shift the demand from single active ingredients to the FDC as patent expiration of single active 
ingredients looms [13,14]. The substitution of less-expensive single drug products with newer, 
high-priced, combinations leads to increases in pharmaceutical expenditures [15]. 
To the best of authors’ knowledge, no empirical analysis has been conducted to assess the 
extent to which FDC drugs expand the effective patent and exclusivity life of pharmaceuticals. 
Due to the growing number of FDC approved by the FDA and the difference in cost between 
FDC and single active ingredients, there is a need for an in-depth analysis of trends in FDC drugs 
approvals and the effective patent and exclusivity life of FDC compared to single active 
ingredients included in the combination. Thus, the objectives of this study were: 1) to assess 
trends in FDCs and single active ingredients approved by the FDA in the period 1980-2102; 2) to 
estimate the time lag between the first approval of single active ingredients and the FDC drugs 
containing those active ingredients; 3) to estimate the time lag between the first FDC approval 
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and the approval of abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) for the active ingredients 
included in the combination; and 4) to estimate the effective patent life of FDC drugs compared 
to the single active ingredients included in the combination.  
Data and Methods  
Data were derived from the electronic versions of the FDA Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book, OB) and the Drug@FDA database from 
1980 to 2012. The study included all FDA approved NMEs and BLAs during the study period.  
Information collected for each FDA-approved pharmaceutical product included the NDA 
number, product number, generic name, trade name, dosage form/route of administration, 
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) code, National Drug Code (NDCs), market status (i.e., 
prescription, over-the-counter or discontinued), NDA approval date, patent expiration date, and 
market exclusivity data. Therapeutic category information was extracted from the ATC 
classification system maintained by the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for 
Drug Statistics Methodology.  
Using FDA data, a dataset with all NDAs and BLAs approved by the FDA during the 
study period was created. All NMEs and BLAs approved during the study period, and all FDCs 
containing at least one of those NMEs and BLAs were selected. The analysis was broken down 
into two groups; FDCs containing at least one NME/BLA at first FDA approval (NME-FDC) 
and FDCs containing single active ingredients approved for the first time during the study period 
(non-NME-FDC). The units of analysis were the first NDA/BLA of all NMEs, BLAs, NME-
FDCs, and non-NME-FDCs approved for the first time by the FDA during the study period.  
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The effective patent and exclusivity life is the time period from the FDA approval of the 
new drug application (NDA) to the expiration of all pharmaceutical patents and market 
exclusivities [16]. The time lag from the last approval of the single active ingredients and the 
first approval of FDCs containing those active ingredients was calculated. The time lag from the 
first ANDA approval of the single active ingredients and the first approval of FDCs containing 
those active ingredients was also calculated.   
When a FDC had a generic alternative, the time difference in the patent and exclusivity 
life of the FDC and the single active ingredients included in the combination was estimated as 
the time between the dates of FDC first ANDA approval and the single active ingredients ANDA 
approvals. When a FDC did not have a generic alternative in the market, the difference in the 
patent and exclusivity life was estimated as the time between the FDC last patent and market 
exclusivity expiration date and the single active ingredients ANDA approval dates. The analysis 
was stratified by pharmaceutical sponsors that marketed both the single active ingredients and 
the corresponding FDC drugs, and by sponsors that marketed FDC drugs but not the single active 
ingredients.  
A descriptive analysis of the variables included in the study was performed. Differences 
among therapeutic categories were tested using Kruskal-Wallis test and two groups Wilcoxon  
Rank Sum tests. Differences between non-NME-FDC and the single active ingredients sponsored 
by the same company and those sponsored by different companies were tested by Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum tests. Inferential analyses, which employ probability theory and test significances, 
were performed on therapeutic classes that had 5 or more FDC drugs. Significance level was set 
at 0.05. All analyses were performed using SAS software, version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, 
NC, USA).  
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Results 
FDA-approved FDC drugs  
In the period 1980-2012, the FDA approved 901 new drugs, including 811 NMEs and 90 
BLAs. NME-FDC drugs represented 3.5% of the FDA-approved NMEs (n=28). The FDA did 
not approve any combination for BLAs.  In the study period, 7 (25%) of the 28 NME-FDC drugs 
were discontinued. The largest number of NME-FDC drugs were antiinfectives (n=7), genito-
urinary system and sex hormones (n=6), and dermatologicals (n=4). The majority (5 out of 7) of 
the FDC antiinfectives was approved in the 1980s and 1990s (Table 4).  
In addition, the FDA approved 117 non-NME-FDC drugs (i.e.  115 NMEs and 2 BLAs) 
that had at least one single active ingredient approved by the FDA during the study period. The 
non-NME-FDC drugs approved in the study period included 156 different single active 
ingredients with an average of 2.1 active ingredients per combination. A total of 23 (20%) of the 
117 non-NME-FDC drugs were discontinued from the market as of December 31, 2012. Non-
NME-FDC drugs approved by the FDA increased over time from an average of 1.2 approvals per 
year (n=12) in the 1980s to 2.5 (n=25) in the 1990s and 5.9 (n=59) in the 2000s. During the 
period 2010-2012, the FDA approved an average of 7.0 (n=21) non-NME-FDC drugs per year. 
The percentage of NME/BLA and non-NME-FDC increased from 5.5% in 1980s to 25.0% 
during the period 2010-2012. The ATC classes with the largest number of non-NME-FDC 
approved by the FDA were cardiovascular diseases (n=41), alimentary tract and metabolism 
(n=26), respiratory system (n=10), and antiinfectives (n=10). 
Overall, 10.4% (n=12) of the 117 non-NME-FDC, were approved by the FDA using the 
priority review procedure (i.e., a review process applied by the FDA to drugs considered 
improvements over already marketed therapeutic alternatives). The percentage of priority review 
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approvals was highest for non-NME-FDC of antiinfectives for systemic use (50.0% of total FDA 
approvals).  
Market Entry and Effective Patent Life  
Non-NME-FDC entered the market at a median of 5.43 years (interquartile range, IQR 
8.57 years) after the first approval of the single active ingredients included in the combination 
(Table 5). This time lag significantly varied by therapeutic class (p=0.0146). Antiinfectives and 
cardiovascular system non-NME-FDC entered the market significantly sooner (median 1.89 
years, IQR 5.41) compared to the nervous system (7.23, IQR 14.32), respiratory system (9.34, 
IQR 4.15) and sensory organs (10.73, IQR 4.86)) (p<0.05). 
The difference in market entry between non-NME-FDC and the single active ingredients 
sponsored by the same company and those sponsored by different companies was statistically 
significant. When the non-NME-FDC and the single active ingredient were sponsored by the 
same company, the FDC entered the market at a  median of 4.50 years (IQR 6.19) after the first 
approval of the single active ingredients included in combination; whereas, when the applicant of 
the non-NME-FDC and the single active ingredient were different, the non-NME-FDC entered 
the market at a median of 10.31 years (IQR 12.04) after the first approval of the single active 
ingredients in the combination (p=0.0112) (Table 5).  
Non-NME-FDC drugs entered the US market at a median of 2.33 years (IQR 9.94) before 
the generic alternative of the single active ingredient included in the combination reached the 
market; the time difference did not significantly varied by therapeutic class (p= 0.0965) (Table 
6). When a non-NME-FDC and the single active ingredients were sponsored by the same 
company, the non-NME-FDC entered the market at a median of 5.05 years (IQR 7.51) before the 
first generic approval of the active ingredients; whereas, when the sponsor of the non-NME-FDC 
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and the single active ingredients were different, the non-NME-FDC entered the market 1.85 
years (IQR 7.17) after the generic single active ingredients reached the market (p<0.0001).  
Non-NME-FDC drugs added a median of 9.70 years (IQR 13.49)  of patent and market 
exclusivity protection to the effective patent life of the single active ingredients included in the 
combination; being the difference by therapeutic class not statistically significant (p=0.1535) 
(Table 7). The difference in the effective patent life between non-NME-FDC and the single 
active ingredients sponsored by the same company and those sponsored by different companies 
was statistically significant. When the sponsor of the non-NME-FDC was the same as the single 
ingredient drug, the non-NME-FDC added in median 7.73 years (IQR 10.29) to the patent and 
market exclusivity life of the single active ingredient. Furthermore, when the sponsor of the non-
NME-FDC and the single ingredient drug were different, the non-NME-FDC added a median of 
11.48 years (IQR 13.48) of patent and market exclusivity protection (p=0.0048).  
Discussion 
This study analyzed trends in all FDA approved  FDCs in the period 1980-2012 and 
assessed the extent to which FDC drugs expand the effective patent life of previously marketed 
single active ingredient drugs.  Study findings reveal that approval of FDC increased 
significantly over the last twenty years and varied by therapeutic class; the largest number of 
FDC approvals were for the treatment of highly prevalent conditions (i.e. cardiovascular and 
respiratory system drugs).  
Antiinfective FDC drugs entered the market relatively soon after the approval of the 
single active ingredient drug NMEs. This strategy may be related with the significantly longer 
effective patent life of antiinfectives, compared to other therapeutic classes, and the high demand 
of antiinfective drugs [17, 18] .   FDC drugs for cardiovascular diseases also entered the market 
35 
 
relatively soon after the approval of the single active ingredient drug NMEs, and represent a 
significantly shorter increase in the effective patent life.  
Study findings also evidence that pharmaceutical companies market FDC drugs shortly 
before the generic version of the single active ingredient drug enters the US market thus, 
extending the patent and marketing exclusivity protection of the single drugs included in the 
combination.  In addition, approximately 80% of non-NME-FDC drugs were sponsored by the 
same applicant of at least one single ingredient drug included in the combination. Shifting the 
demand to FDC drugs as patents and exclusivities of single active ingredients expire may impose 
a financial burden on public and private health programs and patients [19-22].  
The time lag between approval of the single active ingredient drug NMEs and the FDC 
and the increase in the effective patent life of non-NME-FDC drugs differed significantly 
between those non-NME-FDC sponsored by the same company and those sponsored by different 
companies. When sponsored by different companies, FDC drugs cannot enter the market before 
the expiration of the patents and exclusivities of the single active ingredients. Whereas, when 
sponsored by the same company, the pharmaceutical company can market their FDC drugs prior 
to generic entry, expanding the patent and market exclusivity protection of the active ingredients 
included in the combination.   
Pharmaceutical companies often advertise FDC drugs as pharmaceutical products that are 
convenient to the patient [23, 24]. Research is needed to assess the cost-effectiveness of FDC 
compared to single active ingredient pharmaceuticals.   
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Limitations 
Study results must be considered with a few caveats in mind. The study analyzed NMEs 
and BLAs; other biologic products including blood, vaccines, allergenics, tissues, and cellular 
and gene therapies were excluded from the analysis. The study includes the last patent listed in 
the OB for the first product number of the first NDA of each NME and excludes successive 
NDAs (e.g. line extensions). Study data used in the analysis are right censored. The effective 
patent life of NMEs can increase due to new patents listed by the sponsor’s company, patent 
extensions and pediatric exclusivity. 
Conclusion 
Approvals of FDC drugs significantly increased over the last twenty years and varied by 
therapeutic class. The large majority of FDC includes at least one single active ingredient first 
approved by the FDA in the period of 1980-2012. A small percentage of FDC was approved 
using the FDA priority review procedure.  
The time lag between first approval of the single active ingredients and FDC drug 
approval significantly varied by therapeutic class and sponsor’s company of the pharmaceutical 
product. Likewise, the time lag in the market entry between the FDC and single generic drugs 
vary significantly depending on whether the sponsor of the FDC and the single active ingredients 
included in the combination are the same or different. Pharmaceutical companies market FDC 
drugs shortly before the generic alternative of the single active ingredient in the combination 
reaches the market, thus effectively extending the patent and marketing exclusivity life of the 
single drugs included in the combination. The difference in the effective patent and exclusivity 
life between FDC and single ingredient drugs vary significantly depending on the therapeutic 
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class and whether the sponsor of the FDC and the single active ingredients included in the 
combination were the same or different. 
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Table 4. FDA-Approved FDC drugs by Therapeutic Category, 1980-2012  
  1980s 1990s 2000s 2010-2012 Total 
NME-FDC           
Alimentary tract and metabolism 1 0 1 1 3 
Antiinfectives for systemic use 3 2 1 1 7 
Antineoplastic and immunomodulating 0 0 1 0 1 
Antiparasitic products, insecticides and repellents  1 0 0 0 1 
Cardiovascular system 0 0 0 0 0 
Dermatologicals 1 1 2 0 4 
Genito urinary system and sex hormones 1 1 3 1 6 
Musculo-skeletal system 0 0 0 0 0 
Nervous system 0 0 1 0 1 
Respiratory system 0 2 0 0 2 
Systemic hormonal preparations  0 0 1 0 1 
Various 1 0 1 0 2 
Total NME-FDC 8 6 11 3 28 
Single Active Ingredient BLAs and NMEs 217 333 240 83 873 
Total NME-FDC and Single Active Ingredient BLAs and NMEs 225 339 251 86 901 
Non-NME-FDC           
Alimentary tract and metabolism 2 2 14 8 26 
Antiinfectives for systemic use 2 2 5 1 10 
Antineoplastic and immunomodulating 0 1 2 1 4 
Antiparasitic products, insecticides and repellents 0 0 1 0 1 
Cardiovascular system 7 13 15 6 41 
Dermatologicals 0 1 4 0 5 
Genito urinary system and sex hormones 0 0 1 2 3 
Musculo-skeletal system 0 1 2 0 3 
Nervous system 0 0 5 0 5 
Respiratory system 1 2 5 2 10 
Sensory organs 0 3 3 1 7 
Various 0 0 2 0 2 
Total Non-NME-FDC 12 25 59 21 117 
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Table 5. Time Lag between Approval of Single Active Ingredient NME and FDC 
Therapeutic Class FDC and Previously Approved 
Single Drug NME Same Applicant 
FDC and Previously Approved 
Single Drug NME Different 
Applicant 
Total 
No. 
of 
FDC 
Mean(Std) Median 
(IQR) 
No. 
of 
FD
C 
Mean(Std) Median 
(IQR) 
No. 
of 
FD
C 
Mean(Std) Median 
(IQR) 
Alimentary tract and metabolism 15 5.18(3.02) 6.12 (4.81) 7 15.13(7.08) 15.56 
(18.01) 
22 8.34(6.55) 6.31 (8.18) 
Antiinfectives for systemic use 9 4.50(5.18) 1.91 (4.54) 1 0.22 0.22 10 4.07(5.07) 1.89 (5.41)
 ƚ
 
Antineoplastic and Immunomodulating 
Agents 
4 10.12(11.95) 5.59 (14.83) 0   4 10.12(11.95) 5.59 (14.83) 
Antiparasitic products, insecticides and 
repellents 
1 7.63 7.63 0   1 7.63 7.63 
Cardiovascular system 33 3.90(3.57) 2.68 (4.31) 8 7.75(5.68) 7.47 (9.35) 41 4.65(4.27) 3.48 (5.89)
 ƚ
 
Dermatologicals 1 12.52 12.52 1 27.34 27.34 2 19.93(10.48) 19.93 
(14.82)
 
 
Genito urinary system and sex hormones 1 8.56 8.56 0   1 8.56 8.56 
Musculo-skeletal system 1 9.52 9.52 2 12.35(4.16) 12.36 
(5.89) 
3 11.41(3.37) 9.52 (5.89) 
Nervous system 4 9.53(7.66) 6.84 (8.95) 1 24.73 24.73 5 12.57(9.50) 7.23 (14.32)
 
ƚ
 
Respiratory system 6 7.18(4.93) 6.11 (5.71) 3 10.47(1.71) 9.63 (3.09) 9 8.27(4.31) 9.34 (4.15)
 ƚ
 
Sensory organs 4 11.15(3.40) 11.39 (4.38) 2 6.82(4.93) 6.82 (6.98) 6 9.70(4.10) 10.73 (4.86)
 
ƚ
 
Various 1 0.00 0.00 0   1 0.00 0.00 
Total 80 5.64(5.04) 4.50 (6.19)* 25 11.60(7.58) 10.31 
(12.04) 
105 7.06(6.25) 5.43 (8.57) 
Notes: 
ƚ
 Statistically significant difference among therapeutic classes: Antiinfectives for systemic use compared to nervous system (p=0.0275), respiratory 
system (p=0.0412), and sensory organs (p=0.0301), respectively. Cardiovascular system compared to nervous system (p=0.0274), respiratory system 
(p=0.0209), and sensory organs (p=0.0183), respectively. Note that the statistical significance does not hold when Bonferroni Correction was applied.  
* Statistically significant difference between FDC and single drug NME same and different applicant (p= 0.0112).  
IQR=Interquartile Range. 
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Table 6. Time Lag between FDC Drug Approval and Single Drug Generic Market Entry 
Therapeutic Class FDC and Previously Approved Single Drug 
NME Same Applicant 
FDC and Previously Approved 
Single Drug NME  Different 
Applicant 
Total 
No. 
of 
FDC 
Mean(Std) Median (IQR) No. 
of 
FDC 
Mean(Std) Median 
(IQR) 
No. 
of 
FDC 
Mean(Std) Median 
(IQR) 
Alimentary tract and 
metabolism 
11 (-5.08)(4.12) (-5.99) (5.69) 9 6.43(3.89) 5.18 (5.47) 20 0.10(7.06) (-0.20)(10.31) 
Antiinfectives for systemic 
use 
6 (-7.24)(6.16) (-6.07) (4.89) 0   6 (-7.24)(6.16) (-6.07)(4.89) 
Antineoplastic and 
Immunomodulating Agents 
2 2.91(16.20) 2.91 (22.90) 2 2.17(2.85) 2.18(4.03) 4 2.54(9.50) (2.18)(13.47) 
Antiparasitic products, 
insecticides and repellents 
1 (-10.50) (-10.50) 0   1 (-10.50) (-10.50) 
Cardiovascular system 18 (-8.12)(5.34) (-8.42)(7.69) 17 (-1.13)(5.53) 1.42(9.33) 35 (-4.72)(6.42) (-5.12)(11.79) 
Dermatologicals 1 (-1.48) (-1.48) 1 12.27 12.27 2 5.40(9.73) 5.40(13.75) 
Genito urinary system and 
sex hormones 
1 (-0.52) (-0.52) 0   1 (-0.52) (-0.52) 
Musculo-skeletal system 2 (-1.82)(1.43) (-1.82)(2.02) 1 2.49 2.49 3 (-0.39)(2.69) (-0.81)(5.32) 
Nervous system 4 (-0.30)(6.56) 0.78(9.34) 1 11.27 11.27 5 (-2.01)(7.68) 2.39(7.19) 
Respiratory system 7 (-1.52)(5.61) (-3.72)(6.41) 2 (-1.24)(1.54) (-1.24)(2.18) 9 (-1.46)(4.89) (-2.33)(3.90) 
Sensory organs 2 0.96(4.91) 0.96(6.93) 3 (-2.33)(10.80) (-6.33)(20.45) 5 (-1.02)(8.22) (-2.51)(10.75) 
Various 0   0   0   
Total 55 (-4.83)(6.25) (-5.05)(7.51) *** 36 1.66(6.46) 1.85(7.17) 91 (-2.27)(7.06) (-2.33)(9.94) 
Notes:  
*** Statistically significant difference between FDC and single drug NME same and different applicant, p<0.0001.  
IQR=Interquartile Range 
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Table 7. Effective Patent Life: FDCs Compared to Single Active Ingredient Included in Combination 
Therapeutic Class 
FDC and Previously Approved 
Single Drug NME Same applicant 
  
FDC and Previously Approved 
Single Drug NME  Different 
Applicant 
  
Total 
  
No. of 
FDC 
Mean(Std) Median 
(IQR)  
No. of 
FDC 
Mean(Std) Median 
(IQR)  
No. of 
FDC 
Mean(Std) Median 
(IQR)  
Alimentary tract and 
metabolism 
9 8.70(4.80) 9.70(3.63) ƚ ƚ 9 17.84(8.05) 21.51(14.03) 18 13.27(7.97) 11.29(13.78) 
Antiinfectives for systemic 
use 
4 5.77(2.37) 6.04(3.67) 0     4 5.77(2.37) 6.04(3.67) 
Antineoplastic and 
immunomodulating agents 
0     0     0     
Antiparasitic products, 
insecticides and repellents 
1 0.00 0.00 0     1 0.00 0.00 
Cardiovascular system 10 2.34(3.29)  1.05(2.74) ƚ ƚ 15 10.05(6.31) 10.84(7.40) 25 6.97(6.49) 6.98(9.99) 
Dermatologicals 1 17.13 17.13 1 23.85 23.85 2 20.49(4.76) 20.49(6.72) 
Genito urinary system and 
sex hormones 
1 5.72 5.72 0     1 5.72 5.72 
Musculo-skeletal system 2 13.80(4.03) 13.80(5.70) 1 17.03 17.03 3 14.88(3.41) 16.65(6.08) 
Nervous system 4 7.61(7.62) 6.86(12.38) 1 29.60 29.60 5 12.01(11.84) 10.88(13.88) 
Respiratory system 7 9.22(8.96) 10.97(18.02) 2 9.97(14.06) 9.97(19.89) 9 9.39(9.22) 10.97(18.02) 
Sensory organs 2 17.13(3.56) 17.13(5.04) 3 9.17(8.41) 10.99(16.53) 5 12.36(7.59) 14.61(5.54) 
Total 41 7.42(6.54) 7.73(10.29)** 32 13.41(8.47) 11.48(13.48) 73 10.05(7.98) 9.70(13.49) 
  Notes: 
  ƚ ƚ Statistically significant difference between Cardiovascular System and Alimentary Tract and Metabolism (p=0.0053) 
  ** Statistically significant difference between FDC and single drug NME same and different applicant (p=0.0048)  
IQR=Interquartile Range 
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Figure 2. Classification of FDC at First Approval 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Potential Patent and Exclusivity Protection of FDC 
NME & New Combination (NME-FDC) 
 FDC of 2 or more NMEs 
 FDC of 1 or more NMEs and 1 or more already marketed products 
New combination not containing a NME (Non-NME-FDC) 
 FDC of 2 or more already marketed single drug products 
Patents and exclusivities of single products 
 Patents of single products 
 Market exclusivity of single products 
Patents and exclusivities of the FDC 
 Patents of the new combination 
 Market exclusivity of the new combination 
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CHAPTER 3  
FIXED-DOSE COMBINATION AND SINGLE ACTIVE INGREDIENT DRUGS: A 
COMPARATIVE COST ANALYSIS 
 
Abstract  
Background: Fixed-dose combination (FDC) drugs are formulations of two or more active 
ingredients.   
Objectives: To assess the pricing structure and price difference of all FDA approved FDCs and 
single drugs included the combination. 
Methods: Data were collected from the FDA Orange Book and Drugs@FDA. Average 
Wholesale Price (AWP) unit price data were derived from The Red Book.  
Results: The FDA approved 117 FDC. The average AWP difference percentage between the 
FDC and the sum of the single drugs in the FDC is 84.9%±26.2% and varied by therapeutic class 
(p<0.01). The FDC AWP averaged 83.3%±23.4% of the single drug AWP sum when there are 
no generics, and 95.1%±42.3% (p<0.01) when there are 2 generic single active ingredients in the 
FDC.  
Conclusions: The price difference between FDC and single active ingredients in the 
combination is correlated with the therapeutic class, the year of FDC approval, and the number 
of single ingredients in the combination that have generics.  
Key Words: Fixed-dose combination drugs; Average Wholesale Price; Drug Approvals; Food 
and Drug Administration.   
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Introduction 
Combination drugs, or fixed-dose combination (FDC) drugs, are formulations of two or 
more active ingredients in a single tablet [1]. According to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), two or more drugs may be combined into a single dose when each 
component makes a contribution to the claimed effects and the dosage of each component (i.e., 
amount, frequency, and duration) produces a safe and effective treatment for a significant patient 
population requiring such concurrent therapy [2]. FDC drugs are used to treat a range of medical 
conditions including asthma, diabetes, and cardiovascular diseases, and infectious diseases, such 
as HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis [3, 4].  
FDC drugs became a popular marketing strategy of the pharmaceutical industry to extend 
the life cycle of pharmaceuticals, especially after implementation of the Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act in 1984 (i.e., Waxman Hatch Act -WHA), which facilitates 
faster entry of generic drugs into the market [5-8]. Pharmaceutical companies introduced FDC 
drugs to expand their patent and exclusivity periods and to shift the demand to combination 
drugs as patents and exclusivities of single active ingredients expire [8, 9]. The approval of FDC 
drugs allows the pharmaceutical industry to maintain at least part of the sales of the single 
ingredient products experiencing generic competition. The substitution of old less-expensive 
prescription drugs with new costly pharmaceutical products accelerated the growth in 
prescription drug spending [10]. Further, over the last decade, prescribing patterns led to an 
increased utilization of FDC drugs [11-15]. The increasing utilization and cost of FDC drugs has 
raised concerns about its economic burden and overall health benefits for the patient [12, 16]. 
Previous studies assessed differences in the cost of FDC drugs and single-active 
ingredients included in the combination using a convenience sample of FDC. Studies focused on 
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few therapeutic classes such as antihypertensive medications [14, 17-23] and respiratory drugs 
[11, 24-27]. Rabbani and Alexander (2008) compared drug costs of 27 most commonly 
prescribed FDC antihypertensive drugs and the cost of their generic single active ingredients 
using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The total monthly prescription cost was 
lower for 23 of the 27 FDC antihypertensive drugs examined [17]. Hong, Wang and Tang (2013) 
assessed the cost of 26 antihypertensive FDC drugs also using MEPS data [14]. Authors found 
that the FDC drug cost was similar to the non-generic single active ingredients but higher than 
the generic version of single active ingredients [14].  Likewise, study results for respiratory 
system drugs evidenced that on average, the total monthly prescription drug cost of FDC exceeds 
the cost of the single active ingredients included in the combination [11, 24, 27].  
In summary, previous studies were a retrospective analysis of commercial or public 
insurance claims data based on reimbursement rates by patients and third party payers. Studies’ 
findings were mixed and inconclusive with regards to cost differences between FDC drugs and 
single active ingredients. Some studies estimated that the FDC average annual prescription drug 
cost per patient was higher than the cost of single active ingredients included in the combination 
[11, 23-26], whereas, other studies found the opposite [18-21]. Ten out of 13 peer-reviewed 
studies found through a literature review, were sponsored by the drug manufacturer.  
This study builds on prior research to assess the pricing structure of all FDC drugs at the 
time of their first launch into the US market, and compare the prices of the FDC and the single 
active ingredient drugs included in the combination by type of approval and therapeutic class. 
Thus, the specific objectives of the study were to assess the price difference between all FDC of 
new drugs approved by the FDA in the period 1980-2012 and single active ingredients included 
in the combination; and to analyze the association between the price difference of FDC drugs 
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and single active ingredients included in the combination and the therapeutic class, the FDA 
approval year of the FDC, and generic availability of single active ingredients included in the 
combination. 
Data and Methods  
Data for all FDA approved new molecular entities (NMEs –i.e., a new drug containing an 
active ingredient that has never before been approved for marketing in the US), new therapeutic 
biologic license applications (BLAs –i.e., a new biologic license application approved by the 
FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research), FDC drugs, and the single active ingredient 
drugs included in the combinations were derived from electronic versions of the FDA Approved 
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book-OB), and Drugs@FDA. 
Pharmaceutical prices data were extracted from Thomson Micromedex’s Red Book online. The 
Red Book is a reference source for pharmacists for prescription and over-the-counter drug prices 
[28]. It includes pricing history and comprehensive drug information for all FDA approved and 
marketed brand and generic prescription drugs, and over-the-counter drugs. The Red Book 
provides current and historical information of the Average Wholesale Price (AWP -i.e., listed 
drug price for pharmaceutical products sold by wholesalers to retail pharmacies and nonretail 
providers) [28, 29]. The Red Book also contains information about the Federal Upper Limit 
(FUL –i.e., a Federal program that limits Medicaid reimbursement rate for certain multiple 
source drugs when generics are available in the US market). Last, therapeutic category data are 
derived from the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system maintained by 
the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology. Data sets 
were combined by matching the drug National Drug Code (NDC), drug product trade name, and 
active ingredient. 
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The study included all FDC drugs approved by the FDA in the period 1980-2012 that had 
at least one single drug approved as a NME or BLA during the study period. The study also 
included all single active ingredient pharmaceutical products included in the FDC. This study 
followed the FDA classification of FDC drugs at the time of FDA first approval which includes 
NME & new combination (i.e., new combination includes a mix of already marketed products 
and at least one FDA approved NME), and new combination (i.e., all active ingredients in the 
combination are already marketed products). 
Data collection for each FDC drug and single active ingredients included the following 
information: drug product trade name, active ingredient, dosage/strength, form/route of 
administration, package size, unit dosage, application number, product number, drug formulation 
(i.e., FDC drugs, single active ingredient drugs), approval date, NDC, drug applicant, AWP unit 
price and effective date, and FUL unit price and effective date.  AWP data were collected for all 
first New Drug Application (NDA) of NMEs & new combinations, and new combinations at the 
time of first drug market entry. The unit of analysis combined the active ingredient(s), route, 
form, and strength for each FDC drug or single active ingredient. 
The study included the first NDA of all FDA approved NMEs & new combinations, first 
NDA of new combinations containing at least one drug product previously approved by the FDA 
as a NME or BLA in the study period, and all single active ingredient drugs included in the 
combination. The analysis excluded repackages and unit-dose products. When several package 
sizes were available for a FDC or single active ingredient at the first entry date, the package size 
closer to 100 units was used for the analysis. If several generic products were available for a 
single active ingredient, the estimated average price for the single active ingredient generic drug 
with package size closest to the units contained in the FDC was used for the analysis. When there 
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were no generics of the single active ingredients included in a FDC in the US market at the time 
the FDC drug first enters the market, the AWP unit price of the single active ingredients brands 
were used in the analysis.  
The price analysis was performed based on the price difference percentage between the 
FDC drug AWP and the AWP sum of the single drugs included in the combination. When 
several strengths were available for the same active ingredient the price difference percentage 
was calculated based on the average percentage for all strengths. All prices were adjusted to 
2013 dollars using the all items, not seasonally adjusted, US city average consumer price index.  
Descriptive analyses were performed to estimate and compare FDC drug AWP and the 
AWP sum of the single drugs included in the combination. The price difference percentage 
between the FDC drug AWP and the AWP sum of the single drugs included in the combination 
was estimated over the study period, and analyzed by therapeutic class.  
Price differences between FDC and single drug groups were assessed using the Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank test. Price differences among time periods and drug characteristic groups were 
assessed using Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test. ANOVA was used to test the differences of the price 
difference percentage of the combination drug AWP and the AWP sum of the single drugs 
among decades, and drug characteristic groups. A multiple linear regression model was 
performed to evaluate the association between the price difference percentage of the combination 
drug AWP and the AWP sum of the single drugs included in the combination, and the study 
explanatory variables. Independent variables were the number of active ingredients in the 
combination, the number of single active ingredients that had generic competition at the first 
FDC market entry, the first AWP effective year for the FDC drug, and the FDC therapeutic class. 
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Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test, Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test, and multiple linear regression analyses 
were performed on therapeutic classes that had 5 or more FDC drugs.  
Descriptive statistics were also performed using the FUL unit price for single generic 
drugs when available. A t-tests analysis was performed to compare the FUL and the AWP of the 
price difference percentage of the FDC drugs and the price sum of the single drugs included in 
the combination. All analyses were performed using SAS 9.2 statistical software. Significance 
level was set at 0.05.  
Results 
In the period 1980-2012, the FDA approved 901 new drugs, including 811 NMEs and 90 
BLAs. New combinations containing at least one NME represented 3.5% of the FDA approved 
NMEs (n=28). The FDA did not approve any combination for BLAs.  In addition, the FDA 
approved 117 new combinations that have at least one single active ingredient previously 
approved by the FDA as a NME or BLA. These FDC drugs include 115 NMEs and 2 BLAs. 
Overall, 10.4% (n=12) of the 115 FDC drugs including a NME were approved by the FDA using 
priority review (i.e., a review process applied by the FDA to drugs considered improvements 
over the already marketed therapeutic alternatives). The percentage of priority review approvals 
was highest for antinfectives for systemic use FDC (50.0% of total FDA approvals). The number 
of FDC drug approvals increased over time from 12 in the 1980s, to 25 in the 1990s, and 58 in 
the 2000s. In the period 2010-2012, the FDA approved 22 FDC drugs. The 117 FDC drugs 
approved in the period 1980-2012 include a total of 156 different single active ingredients with 
an average of 2.1 active ingredients per combination.  
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The price analysis excluded 22 FDC not marketed in the US as of December 31, 2013, 
and 29 FDC without complete active ingredient, strength, route of administration, approval date, 
and price information. The final analytical sample for the price analysis included 66 FDC drugs.   
The average AWP unit price difference percentage between the FDC drugs and the 
average AWP unit price sum of the single drugs included in the combination is on average 
84.9%±26.2% (Table 8). The average AWP unit price difference percentage between the FDC 
and the single drugs included in the combination varies by therapeutic class (p = 0.0022). The 
FDC average AWP unit price percentage of cardiovascular system drugs was significantly higher 
than the average AWP unit price percentage of alimentary tract and metabolism drugs (86.7 ± 
23.7 and 67.4 ± 20.5%, respectively; p = 0.012). Likewise, the FDC average AWP unit price 
percentage of alimentary tract and metabolism drugs was significantly lower than the average 
AWP unit price percentage of anti-infectives for systemic use (67.4 ± 20.5% and 105.8 ± 16.9%, 
respectively; p = 0.0008). The difference in the FDC average AWP unit price percentage of 
cardiovascular drugs and anti-infectives for systemic use was not statistically significant (Table 
8). 
FDC AWP unit price significantly increased during the study period from a median of 
US$1.40 (IQR US$ 0.71) in the 1980s, to US$ 1.92 (IQR US$0.70) in the 1990s (p = 0.0263), 
US$3.38 (IQR US$3.19) in the 2000s (p = 0.0019), and US$5.78 (IQR US$7.64) in the period 
2010–2012 (p = 0.0014). Overall, the average AWP unit price difference percentage between the 
FDC and single active ingredients included in the combination decreased over time from 119.3 ± 
29.2% in the 80 s to 86.7 ± 23.2% in the 00 s (p < 0.05; Table 9).  
The average AWP unit price difference percentage between the FDC and the single 
active ingredients in the combination increases with the number of single active ingredients in 
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the combination. The percentage average AWP unit price difference was, on average, 84.7 ± 
27.1% when the FDC contains two single active ingredients, up to 86.0 ± 15.0% when the 
combination contains three active ingredients, although the difference was not statistically 
significant (Table 9). 
The average AWP unit price difference percentage also increases with the number of 
active ingredients in the combination that have generic competition. The FDC average AWP unit 
price was on average 83.3 ± 23.4% of the single drug average AWP unit price sum when there 
were no generic versions in the market. This average AWP unit price difference percentage 
increases to 95.1 ± 42.3% (p < 0.01) when there were two single active ingredients in the 
combination that have generic versions in the market at the time the FDC drugs enters into the 
US market (Table 9). 
The average AWP unit price difference percentage between the FDC and the single drugs 
in the combination was significantly associated with the FDC drug therapeutic class (p < 0.001), 
the year when the FDC first enters into the US market (p < 0.001), and the number of single 
drugs in the combination that have generic competition at the time of the FDC market entry (p < 
0.05; Table 10). The association between the average AWP unit price percentage difference and 
the number of active ingredients included in the combination was not statistically significant. 
There were 13 generic single drugs that have FUL price data available at the time the 
FDC first enters the market. The price difference percentage between the FDC and the single 
active ingredient drugs using the average FUL prices, instead of the AWP, was even larger. The 
mean price difference percentage between the FDC and the price sum of single drugs in the 
combination was 104.2 ± 51.2% compared with 78.7 ± 35.2% for the FUL and AWP (p < 0.01), 
respectively. This price difference also varies by therapeutic class. The price difference 
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percentage between AWP of cardiovascular FDC and single drugs was 108.2 ± 16.9% and 71.4 ± 
8.7% for FUL and AWP (p < 0.001), respectively. Likewise, the price difference percentage 
between alimentary tract and metabolism FDC and single drugs was 71.7 ± 31.6% and 62.8 ± 
27.8% for FUL and AWP (p < 0.05), respectively (Table 11). 
Discussion  
This study assesses the AWP per unit for all FDC drugs approved by the FDA in the period 1980-
2012 compared to the sum of the AWP per unit of the single active ingredients included in the 
combination at the time the FDC drug first enters the US market. FDC drug AWP unit prices are, on 
average, lower than the AWP per unit sum of the single drugs in the FDC. However, the price difference 
varied significantly by therapeutic class. In addition, this study reveals that the price difference percentage 
between FDC and single drugs increases with the number of single drugs that have generic competition. 
Study results corroborate previous research regarding pharmaceutical companies FDC drugs marketing 
strategy [14, 17, 22].  Pharmaceutical companies market FDC drugs to maintain market share as more 
single active ingredient drugs lose patent protection over time and more generic drugs enter the 
market increasing competition, and driving prices down.  
Novel study findings provide evidence that pharmaceutical companies’ pricing strategy 
varies by therapeutic class and FDA review process. The AWP per unit of cardiovascular and 
alimentary track and metabolism FDC drugs at first market entry is lower than the AWP sum of 
the single active ingredients indicating that companies reduce the FDC AWP unit price in 
therapeutic classes with high utilization and large number of drug competitors in the market. In 
addition, cardiovascular and alimentary track and metabolism FDC drugs are not granted priority 
review status by the FDA at the time of approval, indicating that those FDC drugs do not 
represent an improvement over the already marketed single active ingredient drugs. Conversely, 
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the AWP unit price of antinfectives for systemic use is higher for the FDC than the AWP per unit 
sum of the single active ingredients in the combination. Antinfective FDC drugs represent the 
highest percentage of FDA priority review FDC drug approvals in the study period. Furthermore, 
antinfective FDC drug approvals include indications for diseases, such as HIV and hepatitis C, 
that typically have fewer formulary restrictions hence, allowing pharmaceutical companies to 
setup a premium price for the combination. 
Further, study results evidence that pharmaceutical companies’ pricing strategy for 
cardiovascular and alimentary track and metabolism FDC drugs is based on setting up FDC 
AWP unit price below the price sum of the individual products included in the combination to 
signal the market that the combination is cheaper. Pharmaceutical companies setup the FDC drug 
price at market entry at the same level of the costliest single active ingredient in the combination 
to shift demand from single active ingredients facing generic competition towards new FDC 
drugs.  
Pharmaceutical companies often advertise FDC drugs as pharmaceutical products that are 
convenient to the patient, with lower copayments and pharmacy dispensing fees associated with 
dispensing a FDC drug instead of multiple single ingredients [20, 21, 30-33]. Prior research also 
explored the clinical evidence on the differences between FDC drugs and single active ingredient 
regimens. FDC drugs reduce the complexity of treatment regimens and increase treatment 
adherence and persistence [34-39]. However, research is needed to assess whether those 
advantages outweigh the potential risk of exposing patients to higher dosage of pharmaceuticals 
and to estimate the cost-effectiveness of FDC drugs compared to single active ingredients 
included in the combination.   
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The AWP is the most commonly used unit price in the US market to estimate the drug 
product acquisition cost that is used to setup payments and reimbursement rates.  The AWP does 
not represent actual transaction market prices; pharmaceutical companies setup a high AWP unit 
price to later on provide substantial discounts and rebates to pharmacies, managed care 
companies and health care payers. Study analysis using FUL prices, instead of AWP, further 
evidence that the AWP overestimate the actual final drug acquisition prices. The price difference 
percentage between the FDC and the single active ingredient drugs using the FUL prices further 
evidences that the actual market transaction prices for cardiovascular FDC drugs may be in fact 
higher than the price sum of the single ingredients when there are generic drugs in the US 
market. 
Limitations 
This study used the AWP unit price to proxy prices of FDC and single ingredient drugs. 
The AWP is an essential data resource for payers, decision makers, and stakeholders and it is 
commonly used as a drug price benchmark by state Medicaid programs, Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers (PBMs), and health plans. The AWP pricing history for almost all FDA approved 
drugs allows price comparison analyses and trends evaluation at the drug population level. 
However, the AWP does not represent the actual transaction price or reflect any discounts or 
rebates [29]. In addition, third-party payers use other methods to manage drug prices such as 
Medicaid Federal Upper Limit (FUL) for multiple-resource drugs [40]. Thus, price differences 
between FDC and single drugs may be overestimated.  
The analysis is conducted based on the AWP at the time the FDC drug enters the US 
market. Generic drug market entry may lead to decreases in drug prices over time [41]; hence, 
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the price difference percentage between FDC and generic versions of the single active 
ingredients in the combination may become larger over time.  
Study findings may not be representative of the combination drug market. The study 
includes 66 FDC drugs with complete information. Price data availability including rebates and 
discounts, and completeness of the information remains a challenge limiting the transparency in 
the pharmaceutical market. Last, analysis is based on the AWP unit price since defined daily 
dose data are not available for FDC drugs. Further research is needed to assess FDC drug 
utilization, actual drug acquisition prices after rebates and discounts, and costs of FDC drugs 
compared to the single active ingredients included in the combination.  
Conclusions 
The AWP price difference percentage between FDC and single active ingredient drugs 
included in the combination is correlated with the therapeutic class, the year of first FDA 
approval of the combination, and the number of single drugs in the combination that have 
generic versions at FDC market entry.  
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Table 8. FDC and single active ingredient drugs AWP unit price by therapeutic class 
Therapeutic Class N Percentage of FDC AWP over sum 
AWPs of single ingredients (%) 
Mean (Std) Median (IQR) 
Cardiovascular System 34 86.7%(23.7%)* 85.6 % (28.9%) 
Alimentary Tract and 
Metabolism 
14 67.4%(20.5%)* 
Ɨ Ɨ
 70.1 % (28.2%) 
Antinfectives for Systemic Use 6 105.8%(16.9%) 
Ɨ Ɨ
 100.0 % (2.1%) 
Sensory Organs 3 98.4%(38.2%) 97.9 % (76.4%) 
Dermatologicals 2 133.3%(33.8%) 133.3 % (47.9%) 
Musculo-Skeletal System 2 87.7%(21.0%) 87.7 % (29.8%) 
Nervous System 2 74.6%(3.8%) 74.6 % (5.4%) 
Respiratory System 2 68.8%(15.4%) 68.8 % (21.8%) 
Genito Urinary System and Sex 
Hormones 
1 49.1% 49.1% 
Total 66 84.9%(26.2%) 84.6 % (31.7%) 
Note: Analysis includes therapeutic classes that have 5 or more FDC drugs.  
* Denotes statistically significant difference of AWP unit price difference percentage between 
the FDC and the single drugs between cardiovascular system and alimentary tract and 
metabolism (p=0.0127); 
Ɨ Ɨ 
Denotes statistically significant difference of AWP unit price difference percentage between 
the FDC and the single drugs between alimentary tract and metabolism and antiinfectives for 
systemic use (p=0.0008); IQR=interquartile range.  
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Table 9. FDC and single active ingredient drugs AWP by selected characteristics of the 
combination   
Characteristics N 
Percentage of FDC AWP over sum 
AWPs of single ingredients (%) 
Mean (Std)  Median (IQR) 
FDC AWP at first market entry  
1980s  5 119.3%(29.2%)*   110.9%(9.4%) 
1990s 14 84.9%(14.9%) 91.4%(23.8%) 
2000s 28 86.7%(23.2%) 84.0%(30.0%) 
2010-2012 19 73.0%(28.8%) 65.8%(30.4%) 
Active ingredients included in combination 
2 60 84.7%(27.1%) 84.7%(32.5%) 
3 6 86.0%(15.0%) 77.7%(31.8%) 
Active ingredients that have generic competition 
0 19 83.3%(23.4%) 84.8%(36.4%) 
1 40 83.8%(24.3%) 85.4%(28.1%) 
2 7 95.1%(42.3%)** 72.9%(48.1%) 
Notes:* Denotes statistically significant difference between the percentage of FDC AWP over 
the sum AWP of single ingredients and decade of FDC AWP at first market entry -1980s 
reference. Indicates statistically significant at p<0.05 
** Denotes statistically significant difference between the mean of the percentage of FDC 
AWP over the sum of single active ingredients in combinations that have generic version for 2 
of the single active ingredients in the combination at the time the FDC drugs entered into the 
US market compared to combinations that did not have any generic in the combination. 
Indicates statistically significant p<0.01 
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Table 10. Correlations between the percentage of FDC AWP over sum AWPs of single 
active ingredients and FDC drug characteristics  
Characteristics Estimate Standard 
Error 
p value 
Therapeutic class 
  
0.0002 
         Anti-infectives for Systemic Use -11.5% 6.5% 0.0833 
         Alimentary Tract and Metabolism 46.7% 10.8% <0.0001 
         Cardiovascular System ref 
  FDC AWP effective year at first US market 
entry  
-1.5% 0.4% 0.0002 
Active ingredients included in combination 
  
0.144 
2 ref 
  3 -16.8% 11.3% 0.144 
Active ingredients that have generic competition 
  
0.0193 
0 ref 
  1 13.5% 7.0% 0.0601 
2 32.0% 11.1% 0.006 
Note: The regression model includes therapeutic classes that have 5 or more FDC drugs.  
Number of observations is 54; R
2
=0.53; ref=reference group 
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 Table 11. Percentage of FDC AWP over single active ingredient prices: AWP and FUL 
  
Therapeutic 
Class 
N Percentage of FDC over sum prices of single active ingredients 
Single active ingredient AWP Single active ingredient FUL 
Mean (Std) Median (IQR) Mean(Std) Median (IQR) 
Cardiovascular 
System 
5 71.4%(8.7%) 69.1% (40.1%) 108.2%(16.9%)*** 81.8% (45.5%) 
Alimentary Tract 
and Metabolism 
5 62.8%(27.8%) 68.8% (83.2%) 71.7%(31.6%)* 103.0% (16.6%) 
Dermatologicals 1 157.3% 157.3% 157.8% 157.8% 
Respiratory 
System 
1 57.9% 57.9% 64.9% 64.9% 
Sensory Organs 1 136.8% 136.8% 232.7% 232.7% 
Total 13 78.7%(35.2%) 69.3% (24.5%) 104.2%(51.2%)** 96.8% (31.1%) 
Note: Statistically significant difference between the percentage of FDC over sum of single drug 
prices based on the AWP and FUL, respectively. *, ** and *** indicates statistically significant 
at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively.  
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CONCLUSION 
The findings of the studies support previous evidence that effective patent life of 
pharmaceutical products has increased since the 1980s. The increase in effective patent life 
length, however, was not significantly associated with an increased number of FDA-approved 
NMEs. Meanwhile, the approval of FDC drugs, especially FDC drugs including at least one 
previously marketed single ingredient drug, increased over the last three decades. Though 
varying depending on the therapeutic class, on whether the sponsor of the FDC and the single 
drug included in the combination was the same or different, and on the generic market entry of 
single drugs included in the combination, pharmaceutical companies marketed FDC drugs 
shortly before the generic alternative of the single active ingredient included in the combination 
reached the market, and effectively extended the patent and marketing exclusivity protection of 
the single drugs included in the combination. 
These results indicate that, given the importance of patent protection to pharmaceutical 
products, longer patent time alone did not contribute significantly to bringing more innovative 
new drugs to the market. Alternative incentives and regulations should be considered by policy- 
and decision-makers for the purpose of encouraging more innovative new drugs. Further, based 
on the entire body of FDA-approved FDC drugs from 1980 to 2012, the study provides empirical 
evidence on the economics behind the development and approval of FDC drugs and the 
statement that FDC drugs of products that are already marketed has been a common strategy for 
brand-name drug companies to extend the patent and exclusivity life of single ingredient drugs 
with an expiring patent.  
In regard to the economics of the FDC drug pricing, the study found that the FDC 
average wholesale price unit price increased significantly over time and that pharmaceutical 
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companies set FDC AWP, at the same level of the costliest single active ingredient in the 
combination as pricing strategy to shift demand from single active ingredients facing generic 
competition toward new FDC drugs.  However, the price difference between FDC and single 
ingredient drugs varied by therapeutic class, the year the FDC entered into the US market and the 
number of single drugs in the combination that have generic drugs at FDC market entry.  
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